Maritime security is perceived in recent years to have been boosted through the implementation of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Codes in July 2004. Most of these security efforts are aimed at preventing terrorists from gaining access to ports and/or ships and inserting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the maritime domain. Far from port however ships on the high seas face peril from new pirate tactics that mimic terrorist attacks and from terrorists who seek to take advantage of maritime “soft targets.” In my previous book, “Rearranging the Deck Chairs,” I examined the inherent risks to cruise-ship passengers both onboard the new “mega” cruise ships coming into service in the last decade and the risks assumed by the ship and passengers when visiting foreign ports.
My experience as the Director of Security for Princess Cruises was used as a basis for examining these threats. In Rearranging the Deck Chairs, I was critical of the security preparations of the cruise industry on many issues. I detailed the threats from pirates and terrorists and the emerging tactics being used by these groups to disrupt maritime shipping. A new threat, aerial attacks by suicidal jihadists already used successfully to bring down the West’s tallest buildings has the possibility of being applied in the maritime domain to create a tactic of frightening possibilities. Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah have already employed anti-shipping cruise missiles against Israeli naval vessels and the advent of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) technology has opened the possibility of low tech attacks against Western shipping. Little if any maritime security focuses on threats from the sky let alone from the traditional surface or subsurface threats.
Notwithstanding the risk to cruise ships and other sea-going vessels from pirates and terrorists, I detail the inherent risk to passengers on cruise ships in Rearranging the Deck Chairs. In the years leading up to the implementation of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Codes, the cruise lines came under scrutiny by Congress and passenger ship victims’ advocacy groups among others. The industry has experienced a remarkable expansion of its fleets with the addition of ultra-large luxury liners that cater to every pocketbook and vacation experience. The industry however has also been a victim of its own phenomenal growth. Cruise ships have recovered relatively quickly from every conceivable disaster at sea and cruise-ship scandal but not without fierce criticism from Congress and the aforementioned cruise-ship victims groups. Cruise ships continue to grow in size and develop new marketing strategies to tap into the huge North American market where according to their own statistics, only 14 percent of the U.S. population has ever taken a cruise.
Cruise ship incidents involving mysterious passenger disappearances, underage drinking as well as sexual and physical assaults have continued to occur at an alarming pace. It is only natural to assume that such incidents would follow when increased passenger loads on cruise ships in previous years averaged 1500 passengers but now average 3000 souls with even bigger ships coming online. Passenger loads on Royal Caribbean’s Project Genesis for example will be nearly 7000. Notwithstanding the phenomenal potential for safety or security incidents occuring ashore, the reasons for such occurrences happening onboard cruise ships is easily understandable. Cruise lines hire personnel to act as “security” on their ships and provide no real law enforcement response to violent sexual assaults, barroom brawls or thefts of personal property. Worse, there is no international standard for the prevention of crime onboard ships or for crimes professionally investigated at sea. The disappearance of George Allen Smith IV off Royal Caribbean’s Brilliance of the Seas in the Aegean Sea in July 2005 is a perfect example. The response of the FBI and the faulty professionalism of Turkish investigation as well as the actions of the ship all combined to present a haphazard response to the loss of life at sea which hinted at a cruise-line cover-up. The attitudes of the cruise line executives who run these fleets are no less discouraging to the prospective passenger. The former CEO of Carnival Cruise Line who referred to the disappearance of George Smith as a “non-incident” seems to trivialize such occurrences and does not seem to be in sync with the IMO's Safety of Lives at Sea (SOLAS) requirements. Such has been the approach of the cruise industry, a sort of “rearranging the deck chairs” while their ships are at risk and maritime security challenges abound.
In the larger scheme, maritime security efforts in today’s threatening world are both encouraging and impressive. Yet with all its strengths and weaknesses, the maritime domain still is at risk from traditional enemies as well as new and emerging threats. At the outset of World War II, Nazi U-Boats roamed freely in the North Atlantic and sent to the bottom of the sea, countless tons of allied shipping bound for the war effort in Europe. As the war progressed, Japanese submarines patrolled the Pacific and preyed on merchant vessels and warships before the allies were able to gain control of the oceans through naval sea power. Threats to merchant shipping and navy ships were numerous and included mines and suicidal kamikaze attacks later in the war. However, early on, the primary threat came from U-boats attacking convoys in wolf-packs. Although the movement of these convoys was secretly guarded, the wolf packs seemed to be everywhere lying in wait for the heavy loaded merchant ships.
The Department of War’s Office of War Information in the United States promoted a public awareness campaign to reel-in the loose talk of sailors and the public on the home front about the schedules of military and merchant vessels. "Loose Lips Might Sink Ships" was one of several slogans which all came under the campaigns basic message - 'Careless Talk Costs Lives.' The slogan was in use by 1942 as this example from the Maryland paper “The News,” in May 1942 shows: “attendees at the local county school registered in the high school lobby before the opening of the meeting, they were surrounded on all sides by placards bearing such admonitions as "Loose Lips Might Sink Ships", "Defense On The Sea Begins On The Shore", "Defense In The Field Begins In The Factory" and other patriotic creeds and slogans. [1] Another wartime poster with the catch-phrase “Someone Talked” featured a man adrift in the sea pointing towards the homeland was used to illustrate the need for operational security or "OPSEC" in the overall effort to stem the tide of war against allied shipping.
As discussed at length in Rearranging the Deck Chairs, the need for OPSEC is as important today as it was in WWII. Just as the terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro in 1986 and killed an American passenger had studied the deck plans and had used a predeployed spy, so too did the 9/11 terrorist’s hijackers conduct their due diligence before striking. In researching the strengths and weaknesses of the security procedures to board the doomed U.S. aircrafts, they also prepared themselves for actually commandeering and flying the aircraft into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. They succeeded in carrying out their attack with military precision. Indeed, the precedence for such preparation for maritime terrorist attacks was set by the hijackers of the Achille Lauro.
Today’s terrorist groups who are already active in maritime terrorism have little value for negotiating terms for their captured comrades like in the Achille Lauro hijacking. Their intentions for attacking maritime targets has turned instead to the complete destruction of the ship and all aboard. Their suicidal tactics have rendered some of the traditional maritime security precautions obsolete. The stark reality according to the experiences of recent history show that the jihadists differ from their terrorist predecessors in their goals. They do not seek autonomy, independence, revolution, control of the reins of government, or political reform. The jihadists have much broader aims, achievable only through perpetual war. The jihadist enterprise aims at incitement. Jihadism is more than a military doctrine: It is about conversion and personal salvation.[2]
The threats to the maritime domain do not end with jihadists’ plots to attack shipping. The overriding goal of the United States’ maritime strategy is to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from entering the maritime global supply chain. Previous terrorist groups understood how useful the possession of WMDs could be, although acquiring them remained in the realm of fantasy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, suddenly the possibility existed that WMD could be used by terrorists and rouge actors. The jihadists are distinguished from their terrorist predecessors in their organized pursuit of WMDs. By the 1990s, the “new terrorism,” carried out by religiously motivated, bloody-minded fanatics determined to indiscriminately kill and murder innocents in mass quantity, coincided with growing concern about the proliferation and inadequate security of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas terrorists holding a city hostage with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons had been the nightmare scenario of the 1970s, terrorists armed with nuclear weapons destroying a city without warning became the nightmare scenario of the 1990s.[3] Today, after the experience of 9/11, those nightmare scenarios center squarely in the maritime domain.
The United States in coordination with the international community has launched several high profile efforts to prevent these acts. In the equivalence of a maritime shell game, the hundreds of thousands of shipping containers entering the United States through the maritime domain are targeted by government officials and the private sector for their potential for transporting WMD. While there are flaws with these programs, the efforts so far have prevented an equivalent "maritime 9/11" from occurring in the U.S. or anywhere in the world.
While the security efforts in the United States maritime environment have been robust and have branded government together with the private sector, the world has shown that it is not a nice place and does not suffer fools. Therefore, more effort is needed to confront and suppress the dedicated adversaries of the maritime domain. Maritime security efforts however have not been applied across all of the maritime industries. The cruise industry for example has been a passive participant in the efforts to secure the maritime domain. They have borrowed on the requirements heaped on the shipping industry by programs such as C-TPAT, CSI and SAFE-Port without adding anything in return. These initiatives all seek to prevent external threats from entering the international supply chain. Shipping companies risk loosing their competitive edge if not active participants in these government programs. Improvements to port infrastructure and shipping company operations to ensure the integrity of shipping containers are required before a company can receive expedited benefits of their cargo. Their combined efforts keep the entire maritime domain more secure. Other maritime industries such as the cruise lines, passenger ferries, fishing and salvage are not required to participate in these government partnerships because they do not have commercial elements subject to its requirements. However, while these industries piggyback exclusively on the shipping industry’s maritime security efforts and enjoy their benefits, thry all have an equal stake on the maritime domain being used and threatened by criminals, pirates and terrorist groups in particular.
The United States is now engaged in building maritime security partnerships in many regions of the world. A worldwide initiative aptly called the “1,000 Ship Navy” aims at partnering maritime resources, including those of military and law enforcement of all maritime nations into strong informational sharing partnerships to increase maritime situational awareness. The major challenge is raising the maritime domain awareness of all these partners to strengthen the ocean environment against those who would use it to disrupt trade along the sea lanes, choke points and trade routes. Such individuals or groups try to do this by taking advantage of the traditional anonymity that the ocean provides. [4]
Loose lips might sink ships is as prevalent a mantra for today’s maritime threats as it was in World War II. The world need not suffer another USS Cole attack or disruption of the sea lanes with an attack on oil tankers like the M/V Limburg before it acts. The lessons of Loose Lips Sink Ships have already been demonstrated across all the threat environments be they land, air, sea space and even cyberspace. Just as the allies reacted and overcame the threats to their naval fleets and merchant shipping in WWII, so too can the enemy be defeated through an open awareness of both the traditional and emerging threats in the maritime domain. After all, just like the popular and successful WWII informational campaign to protect shipping , at its core, awareness is really what Loose Lips Sink Ships is about.
[1] http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/237250.html
[2] Brian Michael Jenkins, James O Ellis III, (et. al.), “Terrorism: What’s Coming The Mutating Threat,” Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), 2007, pg 7
[3] Ibid pp 5 -9
[4] National Academy of Sciences, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Maritime partnerships (Executive Summary) http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12029.html
My experience as the Director of Security for Princess Cruises was used as a basis for examining these threats. In Rearranging the Deck Chairs, I was critical of the security preparations of the cruise industry on many issues. I detailed the threats from pirates and terrorists and the emerging tactics being used by these groups to disrupt maritime shipping. A new threat, aerial attacks by suicidal jihadists already used successfully to bring down the West’s tallest buildings has the possibility of being applied in the maritime domain to create a tactic of frightening possibilities. Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah have already employed anti-shipping cruise missiles against Israeli naval vessels and the advent of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) technology has opened the possibility of low tech attacks against Western shipping. Little if any maritime security focuses on threats from the sky let alone from the traditional surface or subsurface threats.
Notwithstanding the risk to cruise ships and other sea-going vessels from pirates and terrorists, I detail the inherent risk to passengers on cruise ships in Rearranging the Deck Chairs. In the years leading up to the implementation of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Codes, the cruise lines came under scrutiny by Congress and passenger ship victims’ advocacy groups among others. The industry has experienced a remarkable expansion of its fleets with the addition of ultra-large luxury liners that cater to every pocketbook and vacation experience. The industry however has also been a victim of its own phenomenal growth. Cruise ships have recovered relatively quickly from every conceivable disaster at sea and cruise-ship scandal but not without fierce criticism from Congress and the aforementioned cruise-ship victims groups. Cruise ships continue to grow in size and develop new marketing strategies to tap into the huge North American market where according to their own statistics, only 14 percent of the U.S. population has ever taken a cruise.
Cruise ship incidents involving mysterious passenger disappearances, underage drinking as well as sexual and physical assaults have continued to occur at an alarming pace. It is only natural to assume that such incidents would follow when increased passenger loads on cruise ships in previous years averaged 1500 passengers but now average 3000 souls with even bigger ships coming online. Passenger loads on Royal Caribbean’s Project Genesis for example will be nearly 7000. Notwithstanding the phenomenal potential for safety or security incidents occuring ashore, the reasons for such occurrences happening onboard cruise ships is easily understandable. Cruise lines hire personnel to act as “security” on their ships and provide no real law enforcement response to violent sexual assaults, barroom brawls or thefts of personal property. Worse, there is no international standard for the prevention of crime onboard ships or for crimes professionally investigated at sea. The disappearance of George Allen Smith IV off Royal Caribbean’s Brilliance of the Seas in the Aegean Sea in July 2005 is a perfect example. The response of the FBI and the faulty professionalism of Turkish investigation as well as the actions of the ship all combined to present a haphazard response to the loss of life at sea which hinted at a cruise-line cover-up. The attitudes of the cruise line executives who run these fleets are no less discouraging to the prospective passenger. The former CEO of Carnival Cruise Line who referred to the disappearance of George Smith as a “non-incident” seems to trivialize such occurrences and does not seem to be in sync with the IMO's Safety of Lives at Sea (SOLAS) requirements. Such has been the approach of the cruise industry, a sort of “rearranging the deck chairs” while their ships are at risk and maritime security challenges abound.
In the larger scheme, maritime security efforts in today’s threatening world are both encouraging and impressive. Yet with all its strengths and weaknesses, the maritime domain still is at risk from traditional enemies as well as new and emerging threats. At the outset of World War II, Nazi U-Boats roamed freely in the North Atlantic and sent to the bottom of the sea, countless tons of allied shipping bound for the war effort in Europe. As the war progressed, Japanese submarines patrolled the Pacific and preyed on merchant vessels and warships before the allies were able to gain control of the oceans through naval sea power. Threats to merchant shipping and navy ships were numerous and included mines and suicidal kamikaze attacks later in the war. However, early on, the primary threat came from U-boats attacking convoys in wolf-packs. Although the movement of these convoys was secretly guarded, the wolf packs seemed to be everywhere lying in wait for the heavy loaded merchant ships.
The Department of War’s Office of War Information in the United States promoted a public awareness campaign to reel-in the loose talk of sailors and the public on the home front about the schedules of military and merchant vessels. "Loose Lips Might Sink Ships" was one of several slogans which all came under the campaigns basic message - 'Careless Talk Costs Lives.' The slogan was in use by 1942 as this example from the Maryland paper “The News,” in May 1942 shows: “attendees at the local county school registered in the high school lobby before the opening of the meeting, they were surrounded on all sides by placards bearing such admonitions as "Loose Lips Might Sink Ships", "Defense On The Sea Begins On The Shore", "Defense In The Field Begins In The Factory" and other patriotic creeds and slogans. [1] Another wartime poster with the catch-phrase “Someone Talked” featured a man adrift in the sea pointing towards the homeland was used to illustrate the need for operational security or "OPSEC" in the overall effort to stem the tide of war against allied shipping.
As discussed at length in Rearranging the Deck Chairs, the need for OPSEC is as important today as it was in WWII. Just as the terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro in 1986 and killed an American passenger had studied the deck plans and had used a predeployed spy, so too did the 9/11 terrorist’s hijackers conduct their due diligence before striking. In researching the strengths and weaknesses of the security procedures to board the doomed U.S. aircrafts, they also prepared themselves for actually commandeering and flying the aircraft into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. They succeeded in carrying out their attack with military precision. Indeed, the precedence for such preparation for maritime terrorist attacks was set by the hijackers of the Achille Lauro.
Today’s terrorist groups who are already active in maritime terrorism have little value for negotiating terms for their captured comrades like in the Achille Lauro hijacking. Their intentions for attacking maritime targets has turned instead to the complete destruction of the ship and all aboard. Their suicidal tactics have rendered some of the traditional maritime security precautions obsolete. The stark reality according to the experiences of recent history show that the jihadists differ from their terrorist predecessors in their goals. They do not seek autonomy, independence, revolution, control of the reins of government, or political reform. The jihadists have much broader aims, achievable only through perpetual war. The jihadist enterprise aims at incitement. Jihadism is more than a military doctrine: It is about conversion and personal salvation.[2]
The threats to the maritime domain do not end with jihadists’ plots to attack shipping. The overriding goal of the United States’ maritime strategy is to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from entering the maritime global supply chain. Previous terrorist groups understood how useful the possession of WMDs could be, although acquiring them remained in the realm of fantasy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, suddenly the possibility existed that WMD could be used by terrorists and rouge actors. The jihadists are distinguished from their terrorist predecessors in their organized pursuit of WMDs. By the 1990s, the “new terrorism,” carried out by religiously motivated, bloody-minded fanatics determined to indiscriminately kill and murder innocents in mass quantity, coincided with growing concern about the proliferation and inadequate security of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas terrorists holding a city hostage with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons had been the nightmare scenario of the 1970s, terrorists armed with nuclear weapons destroying a city without warning became the nightmare scenario of the 1990s.[3] Today, after the experience of 9/11, those nightmare scenarios center squarely in the maritime domain.
The United States in coordination with the international community has launched several high profile efforts to prevent these acts. In the equivalence of a maritime shell game, the hundreds of thousands of shipping containers entering the United States through the maritime domain are targeted by government officials and the private sector for their potential for transporting WMD. While there are flaws with these programs, the efforts so far have prevented an equivalent "maritime 9/11" from occurring in the U.S. or anywhere in the world.
While the security efforts in the United States maritime environment have been robust and have branded government together with the private sector, the world has shown that it is not a nice place and does not suffer fools. Therefore, more effort is needed to confront and suppress the dedicated adversaries of the maritime domain. Maritime security efforts however have not been applied across all of the maritime industries. The cruise industry for example has been a passive participant in the efforts to secure the maritime domain. They have borrowed on the requirements heaped on the shipping industry by programs such as C-TPAT, CSI and SAFE-Port without adding anything in return. These initiatives all seek to prevent external threats from entering the international supply chain. Shipping companies risk loosing their competitive edge if not active participants in these government programs. Improvements to port infrastructure and shipping company operations to ensure the integrity of shipping containers are required before a company can receive expedited benefits of their cargo. Their combined efforts keep the entire maritime domain more secure. Other maritime industries such as the cruise lines, passenger ferries, fishing and salvage are not required to participate in these government partnerships because they do not have commercial elements subject to its requirements. However, while these industries piggyback exclusively on the shipping industry’s maritime security efforts and enjoy their benefits, thry all have an equal stake on the maritime domain being used and threatened by criminals, pirates and terrorist groups in particular.
The United States is now engaged in building maritime security partnerships in many regions of the world. A worldwide initiative aptly called the “1,000 Ship Navy” aims at partnering maritime resources, including those of military and law enforcement of all maritime nations into strong informational sharing partnerships to increase maritime situational awareness. The major challenge is raising the maritime domain awareness of all these partners to strengthen the ocean environment against those who would use it to disrupt trade along the sea lanes, choke points and trade routes. Such individuals or groups try to do this by taking advantage of the traditional anonymity that the ocean provides. [4]
Loose lips might sink ships is as prevalent a mantra for today’s maritime threats as it was in World War II. The world need not suffer another USS Cole attack or disruption of the sea lanes with an attack on oil tankers like the M/V Limburg before it acts. The lessons of Loose Lips Sink Ships have already been demonstrated across all the threat environments be they land, air, sea space and even cyberspace. Just as the allies reacted and overcame the threats to their naval fleets and merchant shipping in WWII, so too can the enemy be defeated through an open awareness of both the traditional and emerging threats in the maritime domain. After all, just like the popular and successful WWII informational campaign to protect shipping , at its core, awareness is really what Loose Lips Sink Ships is about.
[1] http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/237250.html
[2] Brian Michael Jenkins, James O Ellis III, (et. al.), “Terrorism: What’s Coming The Mutating Threat,” Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), 2007, pg 7
[3] Ibid pp 5 -9
[4] National Academy of Sciences, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Maritime partnerships (Executive Summary) http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12029.html
